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ABSTRACT  
 
Iran’s constitution emphasizes social justice and obliges government to provide a job for 
every citizen. But in fact, the government’s duty to provide jobs has shifted to government 
support for a measure designed to create new employment opportunities through subsidized 
loans to the private sector. This policy has not been successful to date, and the current stock 
of unemployed workers is about three million—12.75 percent of the country’s labor force.  
             To realize the desire of the Iranian people to achieve full employment and 
social justice, the government must implement employment guarantee schemes, or EGS, in 
the most deprived areas. Elected town and village councils can design and manage the public 
works with the help of other government, as well as nongovernment, institutions. Programs 
can be financed using less than ten percent of the annual oil-exporting revenue that is 
deposited in the Oil Stabilization Fund.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran
1 emphasizes social justice through poverty 
eradication and elimination of all kinds of deprivation in nourishment, housing, employment, 
health, and social insurance, and the Iranian government is obliged to provide all the means 
for a decent life for every citizen (Majlis 2005). 
  Increasing unemployment has created concern and discontent. In order to change the 
unfavorable conditions in the labor market, the government has implemented different 
supportive measures, however, credit schemes have formed an essential part of such 
programs. In the past two decades, huge amounts of highly subsidized loans to the private 
sector by state-owned banks could not solve the problem of unemployment and the number 
of unemployed increased rapidly, creating concern of social unrest and economic crisis. The 
government has to apply effective programs to mitigate the problem. Employment guarantee 
schemes (EGS) can create a considerable number of new jobs and, at the same time, 
stimulate economic activities, especially in backward areas. Rising oil prices can facilitate 
EGS finance without imposing pressure on interest rates and private sector investment. 
  This paper briefly reviews the arguments about finance for employment creation 
through private-sector investment and job guarantee schemes. Next, the changes in the labor 
market and the role of credit facilities in generating new jobs in Iran during the past two 
decades are studied. In the following sections, the applicability of employment guarantee 
schemes by using a small fraction of oil exporting revenue in Iran and its consequences on 
inflation and female unemployment are analyzed. Concluding remarks are presented in the 
last part. 
 
2. FINANCE FOR EMPLOYMENT GENERATION 
 
The weak growth performance of developing countries in 1980s and 1990s has led to poor 
labor market outcomes, which have prevented the creation of sufficient jobs for the large 
increases in the labor supply (Cornia 2004). 
  In the 1990s, credit policy had been promoted as the single most important 
mechanism in poverty alleviation and job creation. The lack of access to informal and formal 
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credit by many entrepreneurs had been identified by numerous studies as a major, some even 
say the major, constraint. ILO studies in the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Trinidad and 
Tobago place the lack of capital, especially in the start-up period, as the problem most often 
mentioned by microentrepreneurs. (Schreiner 2002; Honohan 2004). 
  Chen (1996) insists that credit facilities are not the answer to all the problems of 
poverty and unemployment in developing countries, but they are indeed “inducers” to a great 
many actions that can lead to a better quality of life for the low-income groups; however, 
credit programs rarely reach the poorest. One reason for this is that the tiny loans required by 
the very poorest people are too small to generate significant interest income for lenders and 
are expensive to deliver, especially in the case of hard-to-reach rural populations. They 
cannot benefit from credit policies because of their initially low resource base, lack of skills, 
and few market contacts. In some contexts, schemes mainly benefit those who are already 
better off (Montgomery 1996; Kabeer and Murthy 1996; Seibel 2003). 
  It is increasingly believed that the government’s role in promoting employment is not 
limited to financial support. Subsidized loans can create a kind of rent for people who have a 
good relationship with the officials responsible for confirming the loans (Imboden 2005; 
Fisher, Bush, and Gruene 2000).  
  Hyman Minsky (1986) states that there is no internal mechanism in market 
economies to identically match jobs to those seeking them, therefore, government 
intervention is necessary for realizing a full-employment goal. Government can create “an 
infinitely elastic demand for labor at a floor or minimum wage that does not depend upon 
long- and short-run profit expectations of business and can absorb the unemployed, releasing 
them back in the market as needed” (Minsky 1986).   
  EGS are viewed by many economists as programs of promoting pro-poor 
development (Mitchell 2001; Bhaduri 2005; Hirway 2006; Kregel 2006). EGS and employer 
of the last resort can modify the economic growth path so as to include segments of the 
population that are presently excluded from remunerative and productive employment. EGS 
reduces a number of other social and economic costs, such as expenditures on prisons and 
the criminal justice system, health care, social work, and other spending necessitated by the 
effects of the unemployment that has been rising rapidly in recent years. In addition, social 
capital will increase through more social inclusion and economic justice. 
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3. CHANGES IN IRAN’S LABOR MARKET 
 
One of the most pressing challenges facing the government of Iran in the new millennium is 
the creation of enough jobs to absorb the growing number of its work force. According to a 
projection, the labor force in the country will increase by 3.4 percent annually during the 
Fourth Development Plan (2005–2009). This means that the national economy will have to 
provide nearly 4.5 million new jobs by the end of the 2009 to avoid an unemployment crisis, 
which clearly shows the formidable task ahead (Iran’s Management and Planning 
Organization 2005). 
  Rapid growth of the labor supply on one hand and the increased capital mobility 
combined with an accelerated pace of technological change on the other, has posed serious 
challenges for the Iranian workforce. Alarming bankruptcies of inefficient public and private 
firms since the mid-1990s have caused their share of the increased unemployment. As Table 
1 indicates, the number of unemployed has been rising during the past decade. During the 
period from 1976–1986 (The Islamic Revolution and Iran-Iraq War), the growth of 
unemployment was very high, but since 1996 it has been escalating again due to a baby 
boom in the 1980s and the increasing presence of educated women in the labor market. 
While in 1976–1986 the average annual increase in the labor force and unemployed was 
303,000 and 82,000 persons, respectively, these figures for 1996–2000 increased to 744,000 
and 154,000 respectively. Hence, the Iranian economy was able to create 590,000 new jobs 
during past decade thanks to booming oil prices, however, it could not prevent an increasing 
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            Table 1: Average Annual Increase in Labor Force (in 1000s of persons) 
  Labor Force  Employed  Unemployed 
Men and Women     
1976–1986   303  220    82 
1986–1996   321  357  -36 
1996–2006   744  590  154 
Men      
1976–1986   317  244   72 
1986–1996   248  278  -30 
1996–2006   585  489   96 
Women      
1976–1986   -14   -24   10 
1986–1996    73   79    -6 
1996–2006  159 102   58 
               Source: Iran Statistics Center (extracted from different census years) 
 
  The stock of the unemployed for 2006 was 2.992 million persons (12.75 of the labor 
force). However, a more immediate concern was that unemployment has increased 
considerably from 1996 to 2001; although the number of discouraged workers, or voluntary 
unemployed and involuntary part-time workers, is not available. At the same time, the 
number of unemployed women in the labor force is rising. Despite the rapid increase in the 
number of employed women, the differential between male and female unemployment rates 
has widened during this period. Women’s unemployment rate increased from 13.45 percent 
in 2001 to 23.35 in 2006, while unemployment for men was 10.81 in 2006 (Table 2).  
 
 Table 2: Unemployment Rates by Sexes, 1976–2006 
  Whole Country  Urban Areas  Rural Areas 
  Total  Men  Women Total  Men  Women Total  Men  Women
1976  10.2 9.1  16.4  5.1  5  6  14.2  12.6 21.6 
1986  14.2  12.9 25.4 15.3  13.6 29.2 12.9  12.1 20.6 
1996  9.1 8.5 13.3 8.9 8.4 12.5 9.4 8.6 14.4 
2006  12.75  10.8 23.35  11.82  9.83 22.47  14.74  12.89  25.48 
Source: Iran Statistics Center (extracted from different census years) 
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  The rapid increase in unemployment in Iran after 1996 was a reflection of a major 
shift in the composition, as well as structure, of both the demand and supply of labor. Private 
firms were reluctant to invest under the prevailing uncertain conditions and risky business 
environment, so the expansionary policies of the government had negligible effects in 
reducing unemployment. From 1996–2006, unemployment rates for men and women, both 
in urban and rural areas, had risen sharply. Unemployment rates in 2006 (during oil boom) 
were close to those in 1986 (at the height of Iran-Iraq War and the lowest oil prices). Female 
unemployment rates indicate an insufficient number of job opportunities for an increasing 
number of active women. The rapid improvement of the educational profile of the labor 
force brought into the labor market a large number of mostly young, well-qualified female 
workers. These developments took place at a time of significant restructuring and slowdown 
in the pace of economic growth in Iran. The government tried to create more “flexibility” in 
the labor market and to provide subsidized loans to encourage investment, as well as to 
promote production and employment at private firms. However, reduced production costs 
have been too low to compensate for the high risk of economic sanctions against Iran, and 
domestic and foreign investment has remained low. As the result of this preventive business 
environment, the unemployment rate will likely continue to increase unless the government 
successfully implements new employment schemes. 
 
4. EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES  
 
In the late 1980s, the Iranian government started to open up the economy, privatize state-
owned enterprises, and promote private-sector activities. It is widely believed that the 
package of structural adjustment programs that were reflected in the First Development Plan 
(1989–1994) were recommended by the IMF and World Bank. Yet the plan prediction 
regarding high growth in private investment and sufficient job opportunities in the long-
term, especially in the industrial sector, was not realized and the stigma about the low 
productivity of public sector employees and inevitable corruption in expanding government 
institutions remained strong.    
  In the Third Development Plan (2000–04) creation of 765,000 new jobs per year was 
expected to be realized by applying different employment policies, especially through credit 
facilities to private sector, but despite all efforts, total new job opportunities were only about 
580,000. In other words, only 77.3 percent of the employment goal was achieved.    7
  It is estimated that the labor force will grow by the rate of 3.2 percent during Fourth 
Development Plan (2005–09) and will exceed 26 million persons by the end of 2009, so the 
crisis of the labor market will be exacerbated in the near future unless an annual creation of 
900,000 jobs during the plan will be able to decrease the rate of unemployment from 12.5 
percent at its starting year to seven percent by the end of the plan (Iran’s Management and 
Planning Organization 2005).  
  However, while mitigating unemployment has been the priority of development 
plans, the government was obliged to facilitate private investment that would generate new 
jobs while decreasing the number of public employees. The most important remedy so far 
has been credit facility. During 2000–2006, credit facilities to the private sector had risen by 
more than 35 percent each year (Table 3).  
  During the Fourth Development Plan, the Iran Central Bank is obliged to use up to 
three percent of commercial banking reserves for financing employment-creating projects in 
the private sector. Job creation credits can be given to finance labor-intensive projects, 
facilitate the establishment of small- and medium-size enterprises, motivate the private 
sector to invest in deprived regions, and promote non-oil exports.  
 
                            Table 3: Credit Facilities to the Private Sector  








2000  170,895 33.1 
2001  231,354 35.4 
2002  314,039 35.7 
2003  431,547 37.4 
2004  597,324 38.4 
2005  804,361 34.7 
                                Source: Iran Central Bank Economic Report (extracted from different years) 
 
  Since 2005, all state banks have to finance investment of small enterprises whose 
plans are confirmed by provincial employment councils. In 2006, the banking system was 
obliged to provide at least 35 percent of their deposits to small businesses. This rate 
increased to 50 percent of total deposits in 2007. It is expected that these credits will provide 
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820,000 new jobs (Iran Central Bank 2007), yet Iran’s parliament (Majlis) announced that 
there has been widespread corruption in providing loans to small influential groups. Majlis 
concluded that such loans are inflationary and cannot create sufficient, sustainable jobs. 
Furthermore, there is no effective mechanism to supervise the use of the loans. In 2006, the 
banking system provided about USD 90 billion to small firms to create 765,405 new jobs. 
On average, the cost of each new job in small Iranian firms was about USD 12,370 (Iran 
Central Bank 2007), yet it is not clear how many jobs were really created.  
  Many empirical studies show that a large part of the credits that were allocated for 
industries have been used for real estate and could not create expected jobs (Iran Central 
Bank 2007; Karimi 2005). For example, despite government support of cooperatives in the 
course of past 25 years, the Iranian cooperative sector has experienced a very slow growth in 
production and employment, and, at present, there are many inactive cooperatives all around 
the country. As Table 4 shows, more than one-third of the total cooperatives are inactive; 
and it is not clear that among “active” cooperatives what proportion of the firm is really 
working. It seems that it has been very easy for seven people
3 to register a cooperative, 
receive the loan, and divide the money between themselves or use it for more profitable 
businesses like trade, never bothering to start a business and create sustainable jobs.    
 
   Table 4:  Active and Inactive Cooperatives in Iran (2003) 




Industries     4,026     3,216     7,242  44.4 
Mining       864        668     1,532  43.6 
Agriculture    7,960     3,054  11,014  27.7 
Carpet Viewing      553        440        993  44.3 
Civil Works      430     1,224     1,654  74.0 
Services    6,013     1,904    7,917  24.0 
Total   19,846  10,506  30,352  34.6 
   Source: Iran’s Ministry of Cooperatives (2004). 
 
  According to formal statistics, in 2003 the total employment of the cooperatives was 
about 800 thousands person (Iran’s Ministry of Cooperatives 2004), but more than 30 
percent of employment possibilities were lost in the inactive cooperatives, as most of the 
formally announced jobs had never been created. Credits to other private entities have more 
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or less similar stories. Prices of real estate sky rocketed
4 in 2001–05 and clearly showed the 
tendency of the private sector towards high and quick profits in speculation of nontradable 
goods. 
 
4.1  Employment Emergency Measure  
During Khatami’s reformist government (1997–2005), the political pressure of opponents 
concentrated on the problem of unemployment. In reaction to the mounting pressure, in 2003 
the government applied an emergency measure against unemployment. Due to the new 
regulations, any employer that employed a job seeker through the channel of the job seekers 
registration centers of the Ministry of Labor could receive more than USD 3,500 as a 
medium-term loan (repayable in four years) with a highly subsidized interest rate (four 
percent); even though the inflation rate was about 15 percent and the interest rate was about 
20 percent in the formal capital market and nearly 50 percent in informal capital market. 
  Many employers received the loans without adding to existing jobs. In Mazandaran 
province, cooperative officials and the job seekers registration centers agreed to encourage 
job seekers to establish new cooperatives to get about USD 25,000 in loans. Obviously 
enough, as job seekers did not know each other in advance and did not necessarily like to 
have similar activities, many of these newly registered “cooperatives” were not able to 
continue their work and create sustainable employment.  
  The banking system officials stated that in most cases the creditors were neither 
employers nor employees. For example, the owner of a small supermarket could give 
confirmation of seven newly employed workers and receive a loan for USD 25,000. The 
borrowed money was then used in more profitable activities (like real estate speculation) 
without creating any new jobs, as there was no efficient mechanism to control the use of 
these loans. Lack of transparency, accountability, proper supervision, and parallel 
government institutions created great difficulties in decision making and policy 
implementation. The government budget tolerated the burden of about USD 1 billion by 
applying the employment emergency measure. This policy created a limited number of 
unstable jobs, but also caused the inflationary pressure on the economy. 
  The experiences of the past two decades have shown that financing private-sector 
investment with subsidized loans cannot solve the problem of unemployment, and the 
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number of the reserve army of unemployed is increasing, nearly reaching the critical point 
that may result in social disaster. 
 
5. IS AN EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEME POLICY APPLICABLE IN 
IRAN?  
 
As mentioned earlier, Iran’s Constitution has emphasized the “right to remunerative work” 
and “right to food” for all citizens. In the Fourth Development Plan (2005–09), the basic 
rights to productive employment are again accentuated (Iran’s Management and Planning 
Organization 2005). Since 2004, Iran’s oil exporting revenue has increased sharply, but this 
positive external shock has not been able to speed up the economy. The government is 
expected to privatize the state-owned enterprises, while the private sector is reluctant to 
invest in productive activities and generate new job opportunities. It is obvious that the 
government must react to the rising unemployment with new policies. EGS can create 
productive work for people who are interested and able to participate in the economic life of 
society and, at the same time, revitalize the sense of civic duty, citizenship, social cohesion, 
and community involvement.  
  Iran, like most developing countries, faces large deficits in social services and basic 
physical infrastructure, especially in remote and deprived regions. Water delivery systems, 
electrification, roads, drainage and sanitation, schools, and health care centers are in short 
supply. At the same time, many people are excluded from productive remunerative 
employment. A large number of projects could be designed by local governments and NGOs 
(such as town and village councils, environmental protection groups, charities, and women 
and children’s advocacy organizations) to cater to community needs by employing the 
persons who are willing and able to work. So, by implementing EGS employment, 
production will increase and poverty will be eradicated in poor, remote areas. Rising 
international oil prices provide the possibility of implementing EGS without pressure on 
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5.1 The Role of Oil and Gas Exports Revenue in Financing EGS 
The Iranian government can finance EGS with a fraction of the revenue from oil and gas 
exports. During Khatami’s presidency, an “Oil Stabilization Fund”
5 was formed to buffer the 
economy from the external shocks. Due to the rules of the fund, the Iranian government only 
benefits from an internally set price of oil (in 2007, the price of oil was fixed at USD 37 per 
barrel). The difference between the fixed price and the actual market price (USD 90 in 
October 2007) is deposited into the Oil Stabilization Fund. Some fifty percent of this fund is 
put aside for offsetting probable low oil prices in the future and securing a stable income. 
The other fifty percent can be used by the nongovernment firms as loans for investment. 
According to the Fourth Development Plan (2005–09), the government is allowed to use up 
to fifty percent of the Oil Stabilization Fund for investing in productive projects and 
encouraging private entrepreneurship. Therefore, increasing oil prices enable the government 
to implement EGS to generate new jobs, expand infrastructure, and eliminate poverty in 
deprived regions. EGS will help to mitigate regional disparities as workers in such programs 
can participate in many community-based and beneficial activities that will accelerate 
economic growth and have intergenerational payoffs.  
EGS finance will have no negative effects on the private sector. On the contrary, 
EGS will stimulate private investment by increasing aggregate demand and improving the 
infrastructure of backward regions, as well as in job training of employed workers—all vital 
factors for encouraging private investment. 
  EGS can be implemented at the first stage in the seven provinces with the highest 
unemployment rates. The total population of people age 15–64 years in these provinces is 
about 6,162,000 (Iran Statistics Center 2007). About 23.5 percent of the members of this age 
group are students. Therefore, if EGS rations the jobs to one worker for each family, the total 
number of workers in the program in all seven provinces would be less than two million 
(Table 5). All generated jobs would be part-time and temporary, with an average duration of 
four months. About two million people could be employed in these programs at any one 
time. To prevent competition with existing private sector employment, EGS would pay 




                                                  
5 The Oil Stabilization Fund is a special reserve from the oil export revenue. This fund was established in 2000 
for preventing fluctuations in the economy caused by the changes in the international price of oil.    12
 
Table 5: Population Aged 15–64 Years in Selected Provinces (2006) 
Total  Men  Women  Provinces 
    382,593    192,720     189,873  Eilam 
   912,403    471,998     440,405  Hormozgan 
 1,207,255    607,629     599,626  Lorestan 
    985,847    493,893     491,954  Kordestan 
    692,258    351,481     340,777  Kermanshah 
 1,400,207    702,443     697,764  Sistan and 
Balouchestan 
    581,389    289,582     291,807  Chahar Mahal & 
Bakhtiari 
6,161,952  3,109,746  3,052,206   Total  
 Source: Iran Statistics Center (2007) 
 
  The formal minimum wage is equal for all sectors and occupations in Iran. In 2007, 
the monthly minimum wage was about USD 200, yet it is not attainable for a large part of 
the short-term contract workers in public and private enterprises. The “flexible” labor market 
in Iran has pushed down the already low and declining wages. In most small- and medium-
size firms, and even in several large companies, employees either do not have written 
contracts or sign a contract for only one to three months with a monthly salary equal to 40–
60 percent of the minimum wage. Therefore, the wage of EGS cannot be more than 50 
percent of formal minimum wage for five hours daily work. The short-term and relatively 
low-paid work in EGS supports the buffer stock of employment. Whenever the private sector 
demands labor at a higher wage and for more stable jobs, workers can move from public 
work to the private sector.  
  Each council would have the responsibility of preparing an annual action plan for 
taking up works according to the needs of the people. It is expected that a sufficient number 
of projects could be defined in the backward regions. For example, construction of labor-
intensive roads and railroad networks, town and village sewage system construction and 
maintenance, renovation of agrarian and farm drainage systems, cultivation of forests, 
construction of small public facilities and repairs to existing public utilities, community 
centers and welfare institutions, as well as roadside cleaning and rubbish collection can all   13
generate huge employment opportunities and, at the same time, promote economic activities 
in the deprived provinces. All of these programs focus on labor-intensive infrastructure 
creation and maintenance works. Central and state budgets for job guarantee schemes would 
be released directly to the town and village councils. 
  The bulk of employment would be created for unskilled and semiskilled labor, both 
male and female, with or without previous work experience. Like Jefes in Argentina, a large 
influx of women to the program can be expected in Iran, as large numbers of inactive women 
are interested in working if a job is accessible.  
  As mentioned earlier, according to the Iran Central Bank, the cost of one new job in 
small enterprise is about USD 12,370, which is financed mainly by subsidized loans from 
state-owned banks. If the government implements EGS, it must allocated USD 1,000 per 
worker in labor-intensive projects for machinery and equipment, as most of such works 
require very little capital equipment or training (Mitchell 1998). In addition to capital goods, 
the government must pay about USD 100 monthly wage to two million workers on all 
projects combined, making the total costs of EGS less than USD 5 billion, which can be 
easily financed with the money from the Oil Stabilization Fund. The whole package of 
programs would be less than ten percent of government expenditure and less than two 
percent of GDP. Furthermore, by financing EGS with the money deposited in the Oil 
Stabilization Fund, it would not be necessary for the government to cut its current and 
investment budget for implementing the program. By gaining fruitful results and successful 
experiences, the programs can be expanded to all provinces and to all people who are able 
and willing to work. 
 
5.2 Limitations and Challenges 
Organizational Obstacles 
As EGS must be implemented through close cooperation of local government officials and 
NGOs who are most familiar with the economic needs of their communities, arranging the 
processes of design, finance, and execution of projects in appropriate manner will be a 
difficult task, especially in the beginning. “Labor-intensive public works require an 
extensive and solid network of institutions at the local level, with the technical and 
operational capacity to choose the works to be done, to organize the production process, and 
to channel resources to the needy poor” (Márquez 1999).   14
 Experiences  of  Jefes in Argentina and Maharashta EGS in India have shown that 
political manipulation of funds is one of the major problems. The program’s aim is to 
achieve pro-poor targeting, but it may reach only a fraction of the poor so that jobs in the 
program can be rationed. Given the large numbers of unemployed poor who may not 
participate, it is possible that the program may reach its targeted population, but that political 
considerations influence who among the targeted population will benefit. For example, the 
allocation of program funds between provinces or states might be politically biased—
favoring the factions or groups in power or their supporters—rather than determined by 
objective indicators of need, even if the process of selecting individual program participants 
is pro-poor (Marshall 2004; Murgai and  Ravallion 2005). 
  EGS will face difficulties, especially because of mismanagement and lack of 
experience with cooperation between government and nongovernment organizations on 
serious public works in Iran. There is also the risk of clientelism, discrimination against 
special groups, and political manipulation of workers in the implementation of the programs.  
  Local officials and NGOs, especially town and village councils, must play vital roles 
in defining projects and implementing the programs effectively with transparency and 
accountability. In past six years, elected town and city councils have had negligible effects 
on the economic and social well-being of their constituency. They do not have the financial 
and technical capability to design and apply serious programs. They rely mainly on the 
voluntary work of the community and have not been successful in mobilizing the local 
physical and human resources to stimulate economic and social change. EGS will be a 
capacity building program for activating town and village councils and other NGOs by 
providing necessary capital facilities and money for approved public work projects, as well 
as supervising the process of job placement to avoid abuse of resources and discrimination 
against any group of applicants. All EGS applicants must be registered, the list of selected 
workers must be announced, and the data must be accessible to all members of related 
communities to prevent corruption.  
  If EGS cannot be arranged by harmonized cooperation of government officials and 
NGOs, its impacts on the lives of people in deprived areas will be limited and, after a while, 
people will start to think that public works are new source of rent-seeking for interest 
groups. Yet, successful results from EGS in Argentina and India create hope and optimism 
about the probable positive consequences of implementation EGS in Iran.  
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Rising Inflation  
In 2006, about three million people were unemployed and about 53.6 percent of the 
population aged 15–65 years were inactive. By applying EGS at first stage, two million 
persons in deprived provinces would be able to find work with a monthly salary of USD 100. 
The program would increase aggregate demand that may, in turn, generate inflation. 
Furthermore, the private sector must offer wages higher than the EGS fixed wage to employ 
new workers and to prevent their workers from applying for EGS. At the same time, the 
rising income of poor families (as a result of their work in EGS) will cause an increase in the 
demand for domestically produced goods and services, and motivate the private sector to 
expand production capabilities and create new jobs. At present, insufficient demand for 
domestic products such as textiles, home appliances, and electronic devices, coupled with 
high demand for imported clothing and luxury durable goods, has raised the risk of 
bankruptcy for Iranian producers.  
  As mentioned earlier, subsidized loans to the private sector have been the most 
important policy to generate employment in the past two decades. Huge amounts of oil 
exporting revenues have been injected into the country through these loans and there is no 
efficient supervision mechanism to control the use of borrowed money. No one can 
guarantee that the loan can generate new sustainable jobs; yet it is for sure that such credit 
policies are inflationary. Huge amounts of borrowed money are concentrated in real estate, 
accelerating the pace of the price hike. Increasing rent costs were responsible for the 44.6 
and 37.7 percent rise in CPI in 2001 and 2005, respectively (Iran Central Bank 2007). Part of 
the money deposited in the Oil Stabilization Fund can be borrowed by town and village 
councils to be reallocated for EGS instead of for providing more subsidized loans to the 
private sector. As there will be control mechanisms for public projects, increases in value 
added and employment in different economic sectors will occur at the regional and national 
levels. Furthermore, successful implementation of EGS can control inflation by encouraging 
productive investment in the private sector, increasing production in agriculture and 
industrial sectors, and decreasing the share of money that is attracted by real estate 
speculation. Growing private-sector investment can create sustainable jobs and curtail the 
need to implement EGS in future. 
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Jobs for Women 
In 2006, 84.7 percent of women ages 15–64 years were inactive; there are not job 
opportunities for women in most economic sectors. Educated women are concentrated in 
limited activities like education and health, and less educated women workers are mainly 
involved in the manufacturing of textile and clothing, handicrafts, and farm works. By 
implementing EGS in backward provinces, a considerable number of women would be 
interested in participating in the programs, yet labor-intensive projects (mainly construction 
works) would provide very limited opportunities for women. Therefore, it is necessary to 
design special jobs in health centers, child and elderly care centers, libraries, accounting, and 
supervision for educated and less educated women (especially female heads of households). 
Such works would promote the well-being of the communities and empower women as well. 
  Implementing EGS at the first stage cannot reduce women’s unemployment rates 
considerably, as many women would enter to the labor market to fill the positions that were 
created as a result of EGS. In fact, EGS would reveal the real number of potentially active 
women who do not have enough courage to continue the desperate search for jobs in the 
current stagnant situation of the labor market. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the past two decades, credit facilities to the private sector by state-owned banks were the 
most important leverage for creating new jobs. However, generously subsidized loans were 
not successful in generating sufficient employment opportunities for an increasing 
workforce. In fact, a considerable part of the public budget has been poured into channels 
that have not created sustainable jobs. The private sector is not interested in productive 
investment in an unfavorable business environment and credit facility cannot bond the 
creditor to use the money in job-creating businesses. Empirical studies show that a large part 
of the formally registered new firms have been established for obtaining credit facilities and 
either never started any significant economic activities or shut down their firms very soon 
because, in many cases, borrowers tried to maximize their profit by investing in real estate or 
by solving the most important, short-run financial problems with the loans they obtained. 
  The government has not generated employment opportunities in the recent years 
because of implementation of structural adjustment policies such as privatization and 
government downsizing. However, an escalating number of unemployed and increasing   17
concerns about the high economic and social costs of unemployment oblige the government 
to react to the problem with effective policies. EGS can be the most efficient program to 
prevent unemployment and income inequality from becoming a social disaster.  
  Recent oil price hikes enable Iran’s government to apply EGS without imposing 
financial pressure on the private sector. EGS can stimulate the economy of the backward 
provinces and provide the necessary infrastructure to encourage private investment and raise 
agricultural and industrial production in such regions. In the first stages, EGS can be 
implemented in the seven provinces of Iran with the highest unemployment rates. The 
government is capable of financing EGS to create two million jobs in public works by using 
less than ten percent of its oil export revenues. The program can be administered locally 
through cooperation between government institutions and town and village councils, as well 
as with NGOs who are familiar with their communities’ needs. As there were no past 
experiences of such cooperation in serious works, coordinating the appropriate organizations 
will be a great and difficult task. There is also the risk of abuse of resources and corruption 
among the officials and NGOs. Hence, the experiences of Argentina and India in EGS 
implementation create hope and optimism that similar programs can be applied in Iran 
successfully, too.   18
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